Simple, credible and approximately-optimal multi-dimensional auctions
Speaker: SanthoshiniTitle: Simple, credible and approximately-optimal multi-dimensional auctions
Date: 06 Apr 2020 12:00pm-1:00pm
Location: Zoom
Food: Self-prepared
Zoom link: https://harvard.zoom.us/j/855141990
Abstract: In this work, we provide a general framework to construct approximately revenue optimal multi-dimensional auctions from single-dimensional auctions which satisfy a certain “type-loss tradeoff” property. We demonstrate that several commonly used single-dimensional auction formats like VCG, first-price, all-pay, GSP, GFP, etc., satisfy this property. Our result provides the first revenue guarantees for non-truthful multi-dimensional auctions. This also enables us to design the first static, credible, and approximately revenue-optimal multi-dimensional auction.
This paper is a joint work with Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier and Vasilis Syrgkanis.